



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

in his last volume, Earl Russell ordered the detention of the vessels before he received Adams's famous despatch. Throughout the discussion of our relations with Great Britain Mr. Schouler's view of Earl Russell is widely at variance with that of Mr. Rhodes, representing the English statesman as a rather hateful exponent of the extreme pro-Confederate feeling, though in fact he seems to have been disposed to do full justice to both sides. Vallandigham was buried in the gubernatorial election in Ohio in 1863 not, as Mr. Schouler says, under "one hundred thousand adverse votes," but under a hundred thousand adverse majority. Finally, Early's force in the Valley in 1864, so far from being "about the same" as Sheridan's (p. 517), was in fact less than half as large, or about 15,000 to 40,000 (cf. *Battles and Leaders*, IV. 524, note). In view of this disparity the result of the campaign can not be ascribed off-hand to "the superior fighting capacity of Sheridan."

In Mr. Schouler's narrative of the non-military history of the times the government's policy and practice of arbitrary arrests receives very inadequate treatment. The subject is indeed dismissed with a half-dozen bare allusions, except for the *cause célèbre* of Vallandigham. This is certainly a grave distortion of history; for, with the exception of emancipation, no feature of administration policy in non-military affairs had so important an influence on public opinion as that touching civil rights in the loyal states. The failure to give due prominence to the facts of this matter is the most serious defect in the plan and execution of Mr. Schouler's volume.

WILLIAM A. DUNNING.

Charles Francis Adams. By his son, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. [American Statesmen Series.] (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1900. Pp. vii, 426.)

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS stepped out into national politics in 1848, a few months after the death of John Quincy Adams. Those who had never admired the moral combativeness of the father now pretended to have great respect for his memory, and referred to him as "the last of the Adamases," so as to ridicule the son, who was the Free-Soil candidate for the vice-presidency on the ticket with Martin Van Buren. Not until about fourteen years later did it become certain that this third Adams in direct line was to make a brilliant public record. The fact was recognized during and after the war period, but this biography is the first attempt to describe the Adams whose chief fame was won in the field of diplomacy.

In this family, independence seems to be a trait, which is stronger in the fourth than in any previous generation. The present biographer soon wins the reader's confidence by the impartiality with which he sides at one time with John Quincy Adams and at another with Charles Francis Adams. The lives of the two men, between 1830 and 1846, were inseparably interwoven with each other, and the memorable record made

during these years by J. Q. Adams "would not have been possible had it not been for the co-operation and quiet support he received from his son." We are also told that the son so strenuously disapproved of the ex-President's return to public life that the two were for a time not on terms of cordiality. The importance and picturesqueness of John Quincy Adams's service in the House of Representatives causes our author, who has a keen sense of humor, to remark: "The elder man, however, bore up bravely; and, from the spring of 1835, affairs gradually assumed a more cheerful aspect. . . . He had demonstrated that he was right—that he understood himself and the situation. So far as he was concerned the problem of what we are to do with our ex-Presidents did not call for further consideration." When the contests over the right of petition waxed hot and John Quincy Adams took the lead, the son recorded in his diary, as we are informed, a "despairing groan," lamented that his advice had not been accepted, and added, "But, as he [John Quincy Adams] is in it, I must do my best to help him out." Then with quiet sarcasm the biographer remarks: "This resolve on the part of the son was certainly commendable; though it is to be feared that, if the father had been able to find no other resource in the difficult position in which he had then placed himself, his danger would have been extreme." It would be easy to give many more illustrations of remarkably spicy candor.

The first time Charles Francis Adams attracted public attention by any extraordinary ability was when he spoke in the House on the state of the country early in 1861. A committee of one Representative from each of the thirty-three states had been considering the problem of preventing an outbreak of hostilities between the sections. Adams believed with Thurlow Weed and Seward that the South could be reconciled without granting her enough to imperil the legitimate advantages of the Republican victory; that at least it would be best to make all reasonable concessions, so as to show that the secessionists were contending, not for constitutional rights or even a preservation of slavery as it existed, but for its extension or the establishment of an empire where it should be the corner-stone. The Republicans were to be powerless until after Lincoln's inauguration, March 4, 1861. Buchanan's annual message of the previous December was the strongest evidence that he would not adopt a vigorous policy of repression. The conservative Republicans undertook to delay, and if possible, disorganize the secession movement. It is now indisputable that Adams's plan was a wise one, although, as we are told, "the course was at the time distinctly opportunist,—a course in which, amid changing circumstances, but always in the presence of a great danger, he felt his way from day to day." The biographer describes with extraordinary lucidity the particulars of the problem the Republicans in Congress had to deal with. During the period of cabinet-making Adams was much talked of for the head of the Treasury Department; but Lincoln generously offered to let the Vice-President-elect, Hamlin, have the chief influence in naming the representative from New England, and other

circumstances made it desirable that the one selected should come from the Democratic rather than the Whig wing of the party. So the choice fell upon Gideon Welles, who became Secretary of the Navy. It had also been Lincoln's plan to send Dayton as minister to Great Britain and Frémont as minister to France. But Seward was a close friend of Adams's, and practically insisted that if he was not to come into the cabinet, he should have the most important of the foreign missions. The President yielded in a good-natured way.

When Adams went to England, in May, 1861, it was the all but unanimous belief of the Republicans that Englishmen would sympathize with the North. When Great Britain issued her proclamation of neutrality, which recognized that the Confederates were belligerents, it was erroneously inferred that this was an act distinctly friendly to the South. For a time Adams shared in the general irritation on this account, but his biographer does not hold the same opinion; he thinks it fortunate that Great Britain did not wait until after the first important Confederate victories, a little more than two months later, for then a recognition of belligerency would probably have been accompanied by that of independence.

Before the proclamation of neutrality had been issued, but after the war had commenced and the blockade had begun, Seward instructed the United States ministers in Europe that the government was now ready to accede to the Declaration of Paris, of 1856. All the powers signing this declaration stipulated that among themselves privateering was and should remain abolished; that neutral goods in an enemy's ship, and an enemy's goods in a neutral ship (contraband of war excepted in each case) should be free from confiscation; and that blockade in order to be binding must be effective. As will be remembered, the United States had in 1856 declined to become a party to this agreement. Undoubtedly the original aim of the American Secretary of State was to relieve the members of the British government especially from all fear of injury from privateers, and, as far as possible, to remove all excuses for British or French interference in American affairs. But there is little room to doubt that, after the proclamation of neutrality, his purpose was just the reverse—that is, after the United States should become a party to the declaration, to call on Great Britain and other powers to help to suppress Confederate privateering. Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, was the first to suspect Seward's design and was instrumental in having the British and the French governments join in saying that the accession of the United States would be acceptable only on condition that it should be expressly stated that the agreement should not apply to the Confederacy. This took the spring out of the trap. So Seward was the first one to throw it aside, and he and Adams became very indignant that the powers had insisted on such a precedent condition. Dayton, the United States minister to France, did not agree with them. Our author holds that Lord John Russell missed a great opportunity to commit the United States to the declaration, and adds: "Immediate complications

might have grown out of the American Civil War, and those he could in some way have met as they presented themselves; but, so far as the larger and more remote interests of Great Britain were concerned, the case was clear, and he had the game in his hands" (p. 207). Thirty-nine years have elapsed since that day, and the United States have not cared to use privateers in the two subsequent wars. The present biographer is the one that has shown most clearly how Seward made repeated efforts to stir up trouble with Great Britain, and how Russell had a correct, although vague, notion of the aims of the American Secretary of State. Instead of having missed a great opportunity, we think that Russell's action is one of the best of the many examples of his sober judgment and wise resolution to steer clear of danger and to proceed slowly.

In regard to the numerous issues with which the American minister had to deal later, this narrative is highly pleasing on account of both the method employed and the originality with which facts and earlier opinions are treated. The chapter on the Trent affair contains some sharp ridicule of the supposed importance of preventing Mason and Slidell from reaching Europe. Great Britain's demands and preparations for war at that time have usually been very strongly condemned by American writers, but it is the opinion of the writer that when compared with the attitude which the administration of Benjamin Harrison assumed toward Chili, "the course taken and the language used by the government of Great Britain, in December, 1861, and January, 1862, stand amply justified" (p. 235). Over-zealous and ignorant naval officers and scheming politicians are not likely to get what they claim as an unalienable right—to go into history as wise patriots—until such men as this author are burned at the stake. The discussions of the problem involved in the cotton famine, the attempts to ward off British intervention, and to prevent the departure of Confederate warships from English ports, are all fresh, vigorous, and instructive. Without any exaggerated claims they explain the value of Charles Francis Adams's services. He was unlike most men in that his judgment was best when the danger was greatest. His responsibility and success in connection with the Geneva arbitration have never before been so fully described.

It is pleasing to know that the author is not to quit this field, but that the volume before us is regarded as merely "a preliminary study, and in part a condensed abstract of a larger and more detailed work already far advanced in preparation." In the future work the diary, letters and papers of the elder Charles Francis Adams are to be given a large proportion of the space.